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I. Introduction
by Rochelle Gordon & Brian Clauss
In 1987, President Ronald Regan
issued Executive Order 12607 estab-
lishing the Commission on
Privatization, and directed it to “study
and evaluate past and current
privatization efforts” by federal, state
and local governments,1  and to
“develop a framework for a privatization
program,  identifying privatization
opportunities . . . and actions
necessary to create broad based
support for privatization efforts.”2
The Commission issued its report on
March 18, 1988.   Since that time, the
call for privatization has continued as
a means to shrink government and to
provide the public with government
services at less cost and presumably
higher quality. Underlying the prin-
ciple of privatization is the assumption
that private entities are more efficient
than governmental entities because
the former are motivated by market
forces.3
In general, the term privatization
refers to the “transfer of government
assets, including labor, from a
government to a private entity.”4
Privatization is increasingly encoun-
tered in a broad range of services
historically reserved to government,
including prison administration,  pub-
lic parks and land administration and
Privatization of Public Educational Services: The Application of the Doctrine of
Successorship in the No Child Left Behind Era
some aspects of national defense,
including military logistics, supply
and operation.5
 The privatization of public
educational services has, for at least
the last decade, been advanced as a
means to improve the quality of public
education across the United States.
Its acceptance by the public is driven
by the perceived decline in the
performance of American elementary
and secondary students over the last
forty years.6  This arena is clearly a
serious one as evidenced, for example,
by the existence of the National Center
for the Study of  Privatization in
Education at the Columbia University
Teachers College.7 The Reason
Foundation’s Education Director re-
cently wrote an article reporting that
“school choice legislation is all the rage
in 2005.”8  The term “school choice” is
interchangeable with the term “public
school privatization.”
Consistent with current political
sensibilities, the concept of
privatization of public education is
being marketed under the umbrella of
school choice as a means to ensure that
American children are able to meet
learning standards set by the various
state boards of education throughout
the United States.  Indeed, this is the
declared purpose of  The No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA).9
Recognizing that in most major
urban areas, teachers and other school
personal are unionized, this article
will focus on two areas. Will the
doctrine of successorship  impose on
private providers of public educational
services a duty to bargain?  In cases
where the successorship doctrine
applies, which labor board, the
National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) or, in Illinois, the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board
(IELRB), has jurisdiction?
The NCLBA is a massive and difficult
piece of legislation.  Much has already
been written about it.  This section is
intended as a brief overview of the
NCLBA to assist those readers not
familiar with its key components.
Those interested in further detail can
access a variety of media, including
the Internet, for further information.10
The NCLBA applies to school
districts,11 who are the recipients of
federal funds. The purpose of the
NCLBA of 2001  is to “ensure that all
children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a
high-quality education and reach, at a
minimum, proficiency on challenging
state academic achievement stan-
dards and state academic assess-
ments.”12   Its focus is on disadvan-
II. No Child Left Behind Act:
An Overview
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taged elementary and high school
students living in high poverty areas.
In short, its aim is to close the gap in
academic performance between low
achieving students deemed economi-
cally disadvantaged and high achiev-
ing students from economically secure
environments.13   It requires  accurate
and high quality academic assessment
of student performance, improved
accountability systems, and the hiring
and retention of “highly qualified”
teachers.14  It obliges school districts to
notify parents when their child’s
teacher is not highly qualified or if the
school their child attends is “persis-
tently dangerous,” in which case the
parents have a right to transfer their
child to a safe school.15
The NCLBA sets forth the follow-
ing goals and deadlines for meeting
them:
• By 2013-2014 - Proficiency or
better in math and reading for all
students. With respect to reading,
all students must be proficient by
the end of  third grade.  All
students for whom English is a
second language must be profi-
cient in English.16
• By 2005-2006 - All students will
be taught by “highly qualified”
teachers.  All students will be
educated in learning environ-
ments that are safe, drug free and
conducive to learning. All students
will graduate from high school.17
The state boards of education,
referred to under the NCLBA as the
“state educational agency” (SEA)18  are
tasked with enforcing the requirement
that each school district  meets the
achievement standards. To this end,
SEAs are required to measure the
“annual yearly progress”  (AYP) their
school districts are making toward
compliance.19  The following elements
are required to achieve AYP: (1)
identical high standards of academic
achievement for all students; (2)
separate measurable annual objec-
tives for achievement for all students
not altered by virtue of racial/ethnic,
economic, disability or limited English
language proficiency classifications;
(3) statistically valid and reliable
achievement testing and (4) continu-
ous and substantial academic im-
provement for all students.20
Schools that fail to make such
progress are identified as in need of
improvement and must develop
corrective action plans.21  Notice to
parents must be given with their
options to either transfer their child to
another school within the district or
for supplemental educational services
(SES).22  The SES is typically intensive
tutoring by private providers approved
by the SEA.
Continuous failure to achieve AYP
may eventually result in the need for
more dramatic action.  Such action
can include alternative governance.
Specifically, Section 6316(b)(8)(B) pro-
vides that a failing school district will
have to select one of the following
options:23
• Reopening the school as a public
charter.
• Replacing all or most of the school
staff (inclusive of the principal)
relevant to the failure to make
adequate yearly progress.
• Entering into a contract with an
entity, such as a private manage-
ment company,24 with a demon-
strated record of effectiveness, to
operate the public school.
• Turning the operation of the
school to the SEA, if permitted
under state law and agreed to by
the state.
A board of education that decides
to replace all or most of its school staff
at its failing schools will continue to be
bound by the collective bargaining
agreements it has entered with labor
unions representing the school’s
employees.  A decision to exercise one
of the other options, however, will
extinguish a board of education’s
collective bargaining obligations.  Re-
opening the school as a charter school
or contracting with a private manage-
ment company to operate the school,
places the provision of educational
services  in the hands of a private
sector organization.25   Is a  private
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Successorship
sector educational provider obligated
to abide by the collective bargaining
agreement and to bargain with unions
representing educational employees?
The next section examines the concept
of “ “successorship” to determine its
applicability to the privatization of
public educational services.
The successorship doctrine is essen-
tially a private-sector labor concept
that can be utilized to impose a duty to
bargain on a successor employer who
has taken over the operations of an
existing business with a workforce
represented by a labor union.  This can
arise when a business is sold or
through a merger or acquisition.    The
doctrine may apply where a union
seeks to impose on the new employer
(1)  a duty to bargain; (2) a duty to
arbitrate a dispute under the collective
bargaining agreement it had with the
predecessor  employer;  and (3) liability
for the predecessor employer’s unfair
labor practices.
The successorship doctrine as it
exits today evolved from a line of
Supreme Court decisions that began in
1964 with  John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston.26 Wiley acquired  Inter-
science Publishers, Inc. through a
merger.  It retained Interscience’s
unionized  employees to perform the
same business operations previously
performed by Interscience. The union
that represented the Interscience
employees sought to compel Wiley to
arbitrate its claim that certain rights
under the Interscience collective
bargaining agreement survived the
merger. The Court held that “the
disappearance by merger of a
corporate employer which has entered
into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union does not automatically
III. The Doctrine of
A. Private Sector Successorship
Cases
terminate all rights of the employees
covered by the agreement, and that, in
appropriate circumstances, present
here, the successor employer may be
required to arbitrate with the union
under the agreement.”27   The Court
clarified that a contract may not
survive all mergers;28  specifically it
may not survive where there is a “lack
of continuity in the business enter-
prise before and after the change.”29
In 1972, the Court decided  NLRB
v. Burns International Security
Services, Inc.30   Burns replaced a
predecessor employer providing secu-
rity services to a Lockheed Aricarft
Services Company facility.31   The
NLRB had ordered Burns to bargain
with the predecessor’s union and to
observe the terms of the predecessor’s
contract.32   The Court held that Burns
was not obligated to observe the
contract but was obligated to recognize
the union.33   The Court found two
factors critical in imposing an
obligation to bargain on the successor:
a majority of the employees hired by
the successor previously worked for
the predecessor and the predecessor’s
employees recently voted in favor of
union representation.34
A year later, in Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB,35 the Court held
that a successor employer may have a
duty to remedy its predecessor’s unfair
labor practice. The Golden State
Bottling Company was sold to All
American Beverages.36  Prior to the
sale, an unfair labor practice com-
plaint against Golden State resulted in
an order to reinstate a discharged
employee.   All American purchased
Golden State with knowledge of the
NLRB’s reinstatement order, and for
this reason, the Court imposed on All
American liability for its predecessor’s
violation of the NLRA.37   Additionally,
the Court reasoned that failure to hold
the successor liable would be perceived
by the unionized employees as a
continuation of Golden State’s illegal
labor policies and practices, thus
resulting in labor unrest.38
Approximately one year later, the
Court decided  Howard Johnson Co. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.39
Howard Johnson purchased from its
franchisee a restaurant and motor
lodge.40  Their contract provided that
Howard Johnson would not assume
the franchisee’s collective bargaining
agreements, even though  both agree-
ments contained provisions that
obligated successors to comply with
their terms.41   Howard Johnson hired
only nine of the predecessor’s employ-
ees.42   The unions claimed that
Howard Johnson’s failure to hire the
others breached the contracts’ no
lockout clauses and sought to
arbitrate this issue but Howard
Johnson refused.43   The Court held
that Howard Johnson was not obli-
gated to arbitrate because of a lack of
substantial continuity in the identity
of the workforce because Howard
Johnson  hired only nine of the
predecessor’s fifty-three person
workforce.44
The Court further clarified the
test for successorship thirteen years
later in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB.45   Fall River pur-
chased the assets of a company that
had laid off its employees and gone out
of business seven months earlier.46
The predecessor’s union demanded
bargaining and Fall River refused.
The Court approved the NLRB’s
approach of determining, from the
totality of the circumstances, substan-
tial continuity between the employees’
jobs with the successor and the
predecessor.47   It found substantial
continuity because Fall River acquired
most of the predecessor’s real
property, inventory and materials, did
not introduce a new product line, and
the employees’ jobs did not change.48
The seven month hiatus was not
dispositive.49   Because the majority of
Fall River’s employees had worked for
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the predecessor, Fall River was
obligated to bargain with the union.50
In the education arena, the death and
subsequent reincarnation of a commu-
nity college, pursuant to applicable
legislation, resulted in a series of
decisions concerning a dispute be-
tween a labor organization and a
community college employer.  The
first of these cases was decided in 1997
by Chief Administrative Law Judge
Mark Stein.   Metropolitan Commu-
nity College District 54151  involved
parallel unfair labor practice charges
against the Board of Trustees of State
Community College (SCC) and the
Metropolitan Community College Dis-
trict (MCC) based on a refusal to
bargain over changes in wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employ-
ment that resulted when SCC, an
experimental community college,
transitioned into MCC, a permanent
community college district.52   The
union representing SCC employees
demanded that MCC bargain a new
contract following the transition.
MCC refused. At issue were the
successor employer’s obligation to
bargain and  whether it could be held
liable for SCC’s  unfair labor practice of
refusing to bargain during the
transition phase.   Judge Stein noted,
“In the private sector, one who
acquires and operates a business of an
employer found guilty of unfair labor
practices, in basically unchanged
form, in circumstances which charge
him with notice of the charges against
his predecessor, is held responsible for
remedying his predecessor’s unlawful
conduct.”53    Judge Stein also rejected
the employer’s arguments that the
private sector law of successorship did
not apply in the public sector:
Although a public employer, such
as MCC, succeeds another em-
ployer through a legislative or
B. Illinois Public Sector
Successorship Cases
governmental decision, rather
than a business decision, the
effects on employees are the same
as in the private sector.
The policy considerations which
support the private sector ap-
proach are also present in the
public sector.  If employees find
themselves in essentially the same
jobs after the employer transition
and if their legitimate expectations
in continued representation are
not met, their dissatisfaction may
lead to unrest thereby thwarting
the Act’s policy of promoting labor
peace.54
Applying Fall River, Judge Stein
found that MCC was the successor to
SCC and had an obligation to bargain
when it employed a majority of
employees who had previously been
members of the bargaining unit at
SCC.55   The IELRB affirmed Judge
Stein’s Recommended Decision and
Order.56
In a practical sense, a charter school
organization or educational manage-
ment organization (EMO) will have to
hire a majority of the employees who
were employed by the public school
district that grants the charter or
engages the EMO, for it to be a
successor.  In a large school district,
the more interesting question is
whether a majority of the specific
employees assigned to the specific
school that the charter or EMO has
undertaken to operate have to be hired
or whether hiring any of the school
district’s current or former employees
satisfies the successorship test. The
following section considers a threshold
question: which labor relations agency
has jurisdiction to resolve these
issues.
C. Application of the Successor-
ship Criteria to Privatized
Public Schools
Section 1 of the IELRA states the
policy and purpose of the IELRA to:
[p]romote orderly and constructive
relationships between all educa-
tional employees and their employ-
ers.  Unresolved disputes between
educational employees and their
employers is injurious to the
public, and the General Assembly
is therefore aware that adequate
means must be established for
minimizing them and providing
for their resolution.  It is the
purpose of this Act to regulate
labor relations between educa-
tional employers and educational
employees, including the designa-
tion of educational employee
representatives, negotiation of
wages, hours and other conditions
of employment and resolution of
disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements.57
The IELRB has jurisdiction over
educational employers, educational
employees and employee or labor
organizations that represent educa-
tional employees.  Section 2(a) of the
IELRA defines educational employer
to mean:
the governing body of a public
school district, combination of
public school districts, including
the governing body of joint
agreements of any type formed by
2 or more school districts, public
community college district or
State college or university, and
any State agency whose major
function is providing educational
services.58
In view of this definition of
“educational employer,” it is useful to
understand the meaning of the term
“public school district.”  We must  turn
to the School Code for the answer.59
Section 1-3 of the School Code
references “common schools,” “free
schools” and “public schools” and
“school board”  as follows:
IV. Privatization of Educa-
A. Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board - The Educa-
tional Employer Requirement
tional Services
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The terms “common schools”, “free
schools” and “public schools” are
used interchangeably to apply to
any school operated by authority of
this Act. “School board” means the
governing body of any district
created or operating under author-
ity of this Act, including board of
school directors and board of
education. When the context so
indicates it also means the
governing body of any non-high
school district and of any special
charter district, including board of
school inspectors.60
The term “school district” is defined
in the section of the School Code that
delineates the powers and duties of the
State Board of Education.  It provides:
(a) For purposes of this Section and
Sections 3.25b . . . 3.25f of this
Code, “school district” includes
other public entities responsible
for administering public schools,
such as cooperatives, joint agree-
ments, charter schools, special
charter districts . . . and the
Department of Human Services.61
The above section of the School Code
was adopted in 2003 by the General
Assembly as one provision in “[a]n Act
to implement the federal No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001.”62    The only other
section of the School Code with a
definition of the term school district is
the School Construction Law.63
The IELRB has issued several
decisions implicating the definition of
“educational employer.” In McCall
and The Woodlawn Organization,64
the Executive Director dismissed an
unfair labor practice charge brought
against a not-for-profit organization
that operated a Head Start program on
the ground that the IELRB lacked
jurisdiction because the respondent
was not an educational employer as
defined in Section 2(a) of the IELRA.
In 1990, the Executive Director
dismissed an unfair labor practice
charge filed against Loyola University
of Chicago for the same reason.65
The full board recently faced the
issue of whether the Illinois School for
the Deaf (ISD) was an educational
employer under the IELRA.66   The
Illinois Federation of Teachers filed a
unit clarification petition seeking to
add two employees of the school that
were classified as “Educator-Provi-
sional” (EP) to an ISD bargaining unit
of regularly certified teachers.
AFSCME represented the bargaining
unit that included EP certified
teachers. AFSCME and the ISD
argued that the IELRB did not have
jurisdiction because the ISD was not
the actual employer of the employees.
They asserted that the Department of
Human Services was the employer.
The IELRB held that a party is
regarded as the employer if the party’s
presence at the bargaining table is
required. Thus, if the alleged employer
has the authority to hire, promote,
evaluate, discipline, discharge and to
set funding for the employees in
question, as well as authority to obtain
funding and set fringe benefits, it is
the employer.67   The IELRB remanded
the case for further investigation,
holding that if the ISD was the
employer the IELRB would have
jurisdiction because Section 2(a)
defines educational employer to
include “any State agency whose
major function is providing educa-
tional services.”68
The IELRB has not yet faced the
issue of whether  a charter school is a
school district under Illinois law.
Application of the definition of “school
district” provided in  Section 2-3.25 of
the School Code supports a finding that
charter schools are public school
districts and therefore educational
employers.  On the other hand, the
specific section that includes charter
schools in the definition of “school
district” limits it applicability to “this
[s]ection and Sections 3.25b . . . 3.25f of
this Code.”69
Charter schools are governed by
Article 27A of the School Code.
Charters schools existed well before
the No Child Left Behind Act. A
charter school is a “public, non-
sectarian, non-religious, non-home
based, and non-profit school” orga-
nized and operated as a nonprofit
corporation . . . authorized under the
laws of the State of Illinois.”70   It is
established by creating a new school or
converting an existing public school to
charter school status.71 It is adminis-
tered and governed by its board of
directors or “other governing body” in
the manner provided in its charter.72
The governing body is subject to the
Freedom of Information Act and the
Open Meetings Act.73 Nonprofit
corporations, individuals or organiza-
tions that will have a majority
representation on the board of
directors interested in operating a
charter school submit a proposal  to
the Illinois State Board of Education
and to the local school board.74    There
is no specific provision in Article 27A
prohibiting charter school employees
from union membership or labor
organizations from organizing such
employees.  Section 27A-5(g) provides
that charter schools are exempt from
all other state laws and regulations in
the School Code except for Article 27A
and those specifically identified within
that section.75   One of the exceptions is
a section from the General Not For
Profit Corporation Act of 1986,76
clearly not a School Code provision.
The inclusion of that exception may
provide an argument that charter
schools need not comply with any
Illinois statute, including the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act.
Thus, charter schools are not, in a
traditional sense, public school dis-
tricts.  Charter schools  exist within a
school district operated by the local
board of education that grants the
charter.  Once the charter application
is granted, the charter school is more
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or less autonomous in conducting its
operation. The charter school is
governed by its board of directors like
any other not-for-profit enterprise.
Charter schools are not directly
created by law.   The law allows private
persons to form a not-for-profit
corporation to create and operate the
charter school. Accordingly, the
IELRB does not have jurisdiction over
it.   There is no question that private
nonprofit organizations fall under the
jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).
Labor relations between private sector
employers and their unionized employ-
ees are governed by National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).77 Political sub-
divisions are specifically excluded
from the definition of the term
“employer.”78  Charter schools, “con-
tract” school entities  and educational
management organizations are either
not-for-profit or for-profit corporations
incorporated under a state’s law.  It
would thus seem to follow that labor
relations between these organizations
and their employees, either as a result
of being deemed successor employers
or being newly-organized by a labor
organization, would be governed by the
NLRA.
It is anticipated that charter
school employees in Illinois and other
states  will be organized by those labor
unions that traditionally represent
educational employees.  In Massachu-
setts for example,  fifty of the state’s
2,000 charter schools have joined the
Massachusetts Federation of Teach-
ers.79   The question of whether the
NLRB or the IELRB has jurisdiction
over a charter school’s labor relations
is not merely academic.
Federal law controls whether an
employer is a “political subdivision.”80
Entities that are created directly by
the state, so as to constitute
B. NLRB Jurisdiction: Political
departments or administrative arms
of the government, or are adminis-
tered by individuals who are respon-
sible to public officials or to the general
electorate constitute political subdivi-
sions under section 2(2) of the NLRA.81
The NLRB considers the “actual
operations and characteristics” when
determining whether an entity is a
political subdivision.82   State law
declarations and interpretations of
state courts regarding the public or
private character of the entity are
considered by the NLRB.83   However,
the state court interpretations and
statutory declarations are not control-
ling.84
In Management Training Corp.,85
the NLRB adopted a two pronged test
to determine whether it would assert
jurisdiction over a private sector
employer with close ties to an exempt
governmental entity.  It is determined
first whether the employer meets the
definition of an “employer” under
section 2(2) of the NLRA,  and second
whether the employer meets the
statutory and monetary levels for
NLRB jurisdiction. A party to NLRB
litigation may assert that the charter
school is a political subdivision of
government and therefore not subject
to NLRB jurisdiction.
While the issue of whether the
NLRB has jurisdiction over an Illinois
charter school has not been addressed,
the NLRB has provided an analytical
framework for the issue in a case
involving an Arizona charter school.
In  C. I. Wilson Academy, Inc.,86    the
respondent charter school argued that
it was a political subdivision of the
State of Arizona based on a provision in
the Arizona Revised Statutes declar-
ing charter schools to be public
schools.  An Arizona Attorney General
(AAG) legal opinion was cited in
support of Wilson Academy’s position.
The AAG concluded that a charter
school constituted a  “public body” and
therefore was subject to the Arizona
Public Records Law and the Arizona
Open Meetings Act.87
The Arizona Attorney General’s
conclusion was based on a number of
factors, including the numerous
requirements imposed upon the school
by the Arizona charter school law.
Charter schools in Arizona must: (a)
ensure that the school complies with
the applicable federal laws, including
laws relating to education of children
with disabilities, state and local
statutes and all rules relating to
health, safety, civil rights, and
insurance; (b) ensure that the school is
nonsectarian in its programs, policies,
employment practices, and opera-
tions; (c) provide a comprehensive
program of instruction; and (d) design
a method to measure pupil progress
toward pupil outcomes adopted by the
State Board of Education.88   Addition-
ally, charter schools are subject to the
same financial requirements as school
districts, including the uniform sys-
tem of financial records, procurement
rules and audit requirements. The
AGG also considered public funding for
charter schools and the statutory
declaration that charter schools were
political subdivisions of the state for
purposes of participation in the
Arizona State Retirement System.89
The NLRB administrative law
judge applied the two-prong test
enunciated in NLRB v.Natural Gas
Utility District90 to determine whether
Wilson Academy was exempt as a
political subdivision. Neither prong
was satisfied. The first question was
whether the Academy was created
directly by the state, so as to
constitute a department or adminis-
trative arm of the government. The
ALJ found that charter schools  were
“created” by the act of incorporation by
private actors, and therefore were not
created directly by the state. The
second inquiry concerned whether an
individual or group of individuals
involved in the Academy’s administra-
Subdivision Exclusion
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C. NLRB Action: To Cede, De-
cline or Enjoin
tion was responsible to the “general
electorate.” The ALJ found no
connection between the individuals
who operated the Academy and public
officials. He observed that  “neither the
general public nor any public official
has any involvement whatever in the
selection of the Academy’s board of
directors, corporate officers or manag-
ers.”91   The Arizona charter school law
is substantially similar to Article 27A
of the School Code governing charter
schools in Illinois.
Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers
the NLRB to release its jurisdiction to
a state agency in most industries
provided that the state agency’s
governing statute is consistent with
the NLRA.92  In 1957, the Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Board.93   Guss,
doing business as Photo Sound
Products, manufactured photographic
equipment for the United States Air
Force pursuant to a contract that
required Photo Sound to supply a
specified number of its products to
bases throughout the United States,
including one in Utah. In 1953, the
NLRB certified the United Steelwork-
ers as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of Photo Sound’s employees.
Subsequently, the union filed an
unfair labor practice charge against
Photo Sound, but the NLRB regional
director declined jurisdiction because
Photo Sound’s operations were “pre-
dominately local in character.”94  The
union then filed an identical unfair
labor practice charge with the Utah
Labor Relations Board.95  Photo Sound
argued that the NLRB had jurisdic-
tion and therefore the Utah Board was
without jurisdiction. The Utah Board
disagreed. Eventually, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed a Utah Board
decision finding that Photo Sound
engaged in unfair labor practices.
The United State Supreme Court
reversed because the NLRB had not
entered into a cessation agreement
with the Utah Board pursuant to
section 10(a) of the NLRA.  The Court
held that the a state agency may assert
jurisdiction only when the NLRB
executes such an agreement.  Thus,
the Utah Board had no power to
consider unfair labor practices that
fell squarely within the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, even though the NLRB
declined to exercise its jurisdiction.96
The Court observed that Congress
provided the NLRB the option to cede
its jurisdiction in “borderline indus-
tries (i.e. border line insofar as
interstate commerce is concerned),”
where the State agency’s labor act
conforms to national policy.
The NLRB has the power to
prevent state courts and state labor
boards from exercising jurisdiction
over its mission and mandate.  In
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,97  the
Supreme Court held that the NLRB
has implied authority to obtain a
federal injunction against a state
court order regulating picketing at an
employer’s retail establishment.
In NLRB v. California Horse
Racing Board,98  the NLRB declined to
exercise jurisdiction as it had in Nash-
Finch.  The union had better luck with
the Racing Board, however.   The
NLRB filed a Nash-Finch action to
enjoin enforcement of the Racing
Board’s order. The court refused to
consider the union and the Racing
Board’s argument that the NLRB
erred initially in declining jurisdic-
tion, holding that the only inquiry in a
Nash-Finch action is whether the
NLRA preempts state regulation.99   If
it does, the court cannot consider any
other issue arising therefrom, includ-
ing whether the NLRB erred in
declining to exercise jurisdiction.
In Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa,100
the court held that the the NLRA
preempted the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction
over unfair labor practices filed by a
union.  In that case, however, it was
the employer, not the NLRB, who
sought the injunction.  Thus clearly, a
private party can bring an action in
federal court that will accomplish the
same result as a Nash-Finch action.
It is, however, the dicta in this case
that provides a foundation for the
assertion of local labor board jurisdic-
tion over the private providers of
public educational services.  The court
noted that state action is not
preempted “where the regulated
conduct touches interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity that, in the absence of a compelling
congressional direction, a court cannot
infer that Congress deprived the
States the power to act.”101  Because
public education is deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility, it may
be inferred that Congress did not
intend to deprive the states of
authority to act over charter school
labor relations.
The proponents of privatization will
continue their efforts in the name of
school choice.   Under the No Child
Left Behind Act, some school districts
in Illinois may privatize some portion
of their schools.  In the case of Chicago
Public Schools, the Renaissance 2010
program advances a model incorporat-
ing the utilization of contract schools
and charter schools. Labor unions
representing educational employees
will continue their mission.  In that
regard, the use of the traditional
private-sector doctrine of successor-
ship may be invoked where the facts
support it.
More likely than not, unions
representing educational employees
will appear before the NLRB to resolve
disputes with charter schools and
V. Conclusion
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Notes
other private sector providers of public
educational services, absent an amend-
ment to either the NLRA or the Illinois
law. There are public policy consider-
ations that must be addressed in light
of this probability.  The operation of
public education systems has tradi-
tionally been a matter of local concern
rather than of national concern.  As
noted in Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa,
“where the regulated conduct touches
interests so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility . . . , in the
absence of a compelling congressional
direction, a court cannot infer that
Congress deprived the States the
power to act.”102   This exception to
NLRB preemption could be the
foundation for a specific amendment to
section 10 of the NLRA to require the
NLRB to cede its jurisdiction to a state
agency that has jurisdiction over
public education labor disputes.
In our society’s attempt to improve
standards for student achievement,
teacher qualifications, and to create
school choice, do we want labor
disputes resolved at the federal level or
at the state level? If having educa-
tional labor disputes resolved by the
NLRB is an unintended consequence
of the NCBA, it is clear that an
amendment to the NLRA is warranted
Additionally, Illinois lawmakers will
have to consider modification of the
definition of educational employer for
the IELRB to have jurisdiction over
private providers of public education.
1.Executive Order 12607 § 2(a)(1), 53 Fed.
Reg. 34,190 (Sept. 2, 1987).
2. Id. §§ 2(c)(1), (5).
3.See Erin M. Gee, Comment, The Ap-
plication of the Doctrine of Successor-
ship to the Privatization of Government
Services, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 167, 167 (1995).
4.Id. (citing Executive Order12,803, 57
Fed. Reg. 19,063 (1992)).
5. For example, Blackwater USA is a pri-
vate military contractor offering train-
ing and security consulting.  Its slogan is,
“Providing a new generation of capabil-
ity, skills and people to solve the spec-
trum of needs in the world of security.”
< h t t p : / / w w w . b l a c k w a t e r u s a . c o m /
securityconsulting/> (visited Dec. 6, 2005).
6. See, e.g.  Jonathan B. Cleveland, School
Choice: American Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Enter the “Adapt or
Die” Environment of a Competitive Mar-
ket Place, 29 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 75 (1995).
7. See http://www.ncspe.org. (visited Dec.
8, 2005).
8. Lisa Snell, School Choice Legislation
is All the Rage in 2005, SCHOOL REFORM
NEWS, May 1, 2005, at  <http://
www.heartland.org/Articl.cfm?artId
=16878>.
9. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
Pub. Law. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002), codified at  20 U.S.C. § 6301 et.
seq.
10. See, e.g., the web site maintained by
the Illinois State Board of Education at
www.isbe.state.il.us.
11. Referred to as “local educational
agency” under the NCLBA See 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301(4).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
13. Id. §§ 6301(2), (3).
14. Id. §§ 6314(b)(1)(C), 6319(a).
15. Id. § 7912.
16. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(f); 34 C.F.R. § 200.15.
17. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a)(2)(A), 6319(a)(3).
18. Id. § 6311.
19. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).
20. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
21. Id. § 6316(b).
22. Id. § 6316(b)(6).
23. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
24. There are a number of for-profit edu-
cational service/management providers.
In the industry, they are sometimes
called “EMO” for education management
organization.  A well known organization
is Edison Schools, Inc.  Edison’s web site
states that it is “the nation’s leading part-
ner with public schools and school dis-
tricts, focused on raising student achieve-
ment through its research-based school
design, uniquely aligned assessment sys-
tems, interactive professional develop-
ment, integrated use of technology and
other proven program features.” <http://
w w w . e d i s o n s c h o o l s . c o m / h o m e /
home.cfm> (visited Dec. 5, 2005).  It rep-
resents that it is achieving annual aca-
demic gains well above national norms,
serves more than 330,000 public school
students in over 25 states across the coun-
try and in the U.K. through its whole
school management partnerships with
districts and charter schools; summer,
after-school, and supplemental educa-
tional services (“SES”)  programs. Id.
25.  In the event that a state educational
agency assumes the operation of a school
district, it may or may not inherit a school
district’s collective bargaining obligations
under a successorship analysis. The func-
tion of providing public education would
however continue to be performed by a
governmental agency.  Clearly, disputes
over refusals to bargain or other alleged
unfair labor practices would be within the
jurisdiction of a state labor board such as
the IELRB.
26. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
27. Id. at 548.
28. Id. at 551.
29. Id.
30. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
31. Id. at 274.
32. Id. at 276.
33. Id. at 278-79, 287-88.
34. Id. at 277-78.
35. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
36. Id. at 170.
37. Id. at 171
38. Id. at 184.
39. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
40. Id. at 250.
41. Id. at 251-52.
42. Id. at 252-53.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 262-63.
45. 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id. at 46.
50. Id. at 47.
51. 13 PERI ¶1047 (IELRB ALJ1997).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 15 PERI ¶1046 (IELRB 1998).
57. 115 ILCS 5/1 (emphasis added).
58. 115 ILCS 5/2(a). Financial Oversight
Panels created pursuant to Section 1A-8
of the School Code are specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of “educational
employer.” Id.
59. Article VII of the Illinois Constitution
does not define the term “school district”.
Section 1 states that school districts are
not a “unit of local government.”  Section
8 is titled “Powers and Officers of School
Districts and Units of Local Government
Other than Counties.” It provides that
these entities shall have only those pow-
ers granted by law.
60. 105 ILCS 5/1-3. This provision also
refers to a “special charter district.”  This
should not be confused with the term
“charter school.” A special charter district
means any city, township or district or-
ganized into a school district, under a spe-
cial Act or charter of the General Assem-
bly or in which schools are now managed
and operating within such unit in whole
or in part under the terms of such special
Act or charter.
61. 105 ILCS 5/2-3.25a ((Emphasis
added).
62. P.A. 93-470 (effective Aug. 3, 2003).
63. 105 ILCS 230/5-1 defines “school dis-
trict” to include a cooperative high school,
which shall be considered a high school
district for the purpose of calculating its
grant index.
64. 2 PERI ¶ 1112 (IELRB Exec.
Dir.1986).
65. Galemb and. Loyola Univ. of Chicago,
6 PERI ¶ 1157 (IELRB Exec. Dir. 1990)
66. State of Illinois Departments of Cen-
tral Management Services and Illinois
Federation of Teachers Local 919, 21 PERI
¶ 1 (IELRB 2004).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 105 ILCS 5/1-3.25(a)(7).
70. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(a).
71. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(b).
72. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(c).
9Fall 2005IPER REPORT
   ?
73. Id.
74. For details on the required contents
of a charter school proposal, see 105 ILCS
5/27A-7.
75. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g) (emphasis
added).
76. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g)(4).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq.
78. Id. § 152(2).
79. See  Anand Vaishnav, Some Charter
Teachers Join Union, BOST. GLOBE, Aug.
10, 2005.
80.  NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist.,
402 U.S. 600, 602-03 (1971).
81.  Id. at 604-05.
82.  Id. at 604.
83. Id. at 602.
84. Id.
85. 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995).
86. Case No. 28-CA-16809, JD(SF)-53-02,
2002 WL 1880478 (NLRB ALJ July 31,
2002). In Wilson Academy, an unfair la-
bor practice charge was filed based on dis-
ciplinary action, including discharge,
taken against six employees, and by in-
terrogating employees about their union
or concerted activities.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Ariz. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 195-
10 (Sept. 15, 1995)).
89. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-
183(E)(1)-(4), (6)-(7)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Shelby Sch. v. Az. State Bd.
of Ed., 192 Ariz. 156 (1988), which ex-
plained that charter schools “operate as
separate entities from the state, but are
subject to the same agency supervision
and oversight as any other contracting
entity”).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), provides in perti-
nent part:
The Board is empowered . . . by
agreement with any agency of any
State or territory to cede to such agency
jurisdiction over any cases in any
industry (other than mining . . . and
transportation except where predomi-
nately local in character) even though
such cases may involve labor disputes
affecting commerce, unless the provi-
sions of the State . . . statute applicable
to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the
corresponding provision of this Act or
has received a construction inconsistent
therewith.
93. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 13.
97. 404 U.S. 138, 148 (1971).
98. 940 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 542.
100. 45 F.3rd 1261 (9th Cir. 1995).
101. See NLRB v. YMCA, 192 F.3d 1111
(8th Cir. 1999) (NLRB assertion of juris-
diction over the provider of a Head Start
program operated by a private entity un-
der contract with a county governmental
agency).
102. Bud Antle, Inc., 45 F.3d at 1268.
  
Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-
ments under the two collective
bargaining statutes.
In Yarcheski and Governors State
Univ., No. 2005-CA-0044-C (IELRB
2005), the IELRB affirmed the
Executive Director’s recommended
dismissal of charges that the univer-
sity  refused to comply with a binding
arbitration award.   The arbitration
arose out of a grievance filed by
Yarcheski contesting his non-renewal
for the 2002-03 academic year. During
the arbitration hearing, the univer-
sity argued that Yarcheski’s remedy
be limited because he had misrepre-
sented his employment experience
when applying for employment. The
union objected and the arbitrator
reserved resolution and limited evi-
dence and arguments on this issue.
The arbitrator determined that the
university violated Yarcheski’s con-
tractual rights by not evaluating his
performance based upon his primary
teaching duties and directed the
University to reinstate Yarcheski and
make him whole for salary and
benefits lost for the 2002-03 academic
year. The arbitrator retained jurisdic-
tion for 60 days to resolve disputes
regarding application of the  remedy.
The university sought to reopen
the record and argued that Yarcheski’s
misrepresentations were grounds to
refuse to implement the arbitrator’s
award.  The arbitrator informed the
IELRA Developments
Arbitration
parties that unless material issues of
fact were in dispute, he would issue a
supplemental award; otherwise, he
would convene an evidentiary hearing.
The university and union then
submitted letters and affidavits to the
arbitrator.
The arbitrator issued a “Supple-
mental Opinion and Award on
Remedy” which explained that the
material facts described by the parties
in their written submissions were
undisputed.  The arbitrator amended
his earlier award by finding that the
university did not have to reinstate
Yarcheski because  he had secured the
job by questionable means. The
amended award still provided for lost
pay and benefits for 2002-03.  Yarcheski
argued that the original award was
final and binding and that the
supplemental award was invalid.
The IELRB found the supplemen-
tal award binding.  The arbitrator did
not rule on whether Yarcheski would
have been properly dismissed for his
alleged misrepresentation, but only
considered the alleged misrepresenta-
tion with respect to the appropriate
remedy. The parties stipulated that
the issue of the appropriate remedy
was before the arbitrator; thus, the
supplemental award was rendered in
accordance with the applicable proce-
dure.
Moreover, there was no statutory
provision with which the award
conflicted.  According to the IELRB,
the award was “not patently repug-
nant” to the purposes and policies of
the IELRA.
Lastly, the IELRB reasoned,
arbitrators generally have the author-
ity to “complete an arbitration that is
not complete.” The arbitrator’s re-
tained jurisdiction over “application of
the remedy” included considering the
effect of the alleged misrepresentation.
The IELRB stated that the difference
between the original and supplemental
awards did not invalidate the supple-
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Confidential Employees
mental award.
In Community Consolidated Sch.
Dist. 15 and Educational Support
Personnel Ass’n, IEA-NEA, Case No.
2005-UC-0001-C (IELRB 2005), the
IELRB affirmed the Executive
Director’s recommended decision that
two Class IV Secretaries in the
Business Department were not confi-
dential employees, and ordered that
they remain in the bargaining unit.
Section 2(b) of the IELRA excludes
confidential employees from the
definition of “educational employee.”
Section 2(n) contains two tests for
confidential status.  Under  section
2(n)(i), known as the “labor nexus
test,”  a confidential employee is one
who in the regular course of duties
acts in a confidential capacity to
persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies
with regard to labor relations.  The
IELRB upheld the Executive Director’s
determination that the business
manager formulated but did not
determine or effectuate management
policies with regard to labor relations.
Under section 2(n)(ii), known as
the “access test,” a confidential
employee is one who in the regular
course of duties has access to
information relating to the effectua-
tion or review of the employer’s
collective bargaining policies.  The
IELRB recognized that the secretaries
at issue assisted management in
costing out bargaining proposals, but
observed that the employer failed to
establish that they had a role beyond
compiling information or that they
knew how the information would be
used.
Contract Bar Rule
In Unit Five Teaching Assistants
Ass’n IEA-NEA and Local 362,
Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am. and
Community Unit Sch. Dist. 5, No.
concluded that the district and Local
362 had agreed on all aspects of health
insurance that concerned the district.
Consequently, sufficient details had
been agreed upon to bar the
representation petition
Discrimination
In Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1,
and Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 2005-
CA-0055-C (IELRB 2005), the IELRB
held that the Chicago Board of
Education (CBE) violated sections
14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA
when it refused to hire a teacher in
order to avoid paying backpay that was
awarded by an arbitrator.
On November 22, 1998, the
teacher’s teaching position was closed,
and he was placed in the reassigned
teachers’ pool. He was honorably
terminated when he failed to obtain
another position within ten months
after his reassignment. The union
grieved and an arbitrator issued an
award which stated that if the teacher
secured a permanent position during
the 2003-04 school year, the CBE must
make him whole for salary and
benefits lost as a result of his
termination. In addition, CBE could
not communicate this information to
principals or other individuals who
may be in a position to recommend the
teacher into a permanent position.
Between August 6, 2003 and June
24, 2004, the teacher sent out 47
resumes but was unable to obtain a
permanent position. Although he
received several interviews, no one
called him about a position. A
consultant and agent of the CBE for
finding and hiring teachers, told the
teacher that he could not help him find
employment because the CBE was
unwilling to pay him backpay as
awared in the arbitration.
The IELRB held that union
established a prima facie case that the
CBE violated sections (14(a)(3) and
14(a)(1). The IELRB determined that
2005-RC-0016-S (IELRB 2005), the
IELRB held that association’s repre-
sentation petition was barred by the
contract between Local 362 and the
district. The association filed the
petition on March 29, 2005, seeking to
represent full-time and part-time
maintenance and custodial employees
who were already represented by Local
362.  Local 362 and the district had
reached tentative agreement on a new
contract which was ratified by Local
362 members on April 2, 2005, and by
the district’s board on April 13.
The IELRB reaffirmed its decision
in  Dupo Community Unit School
Dist. 196, No. 4 PERI ¶ 1117 (IELRB
1998), which held that a tentative
agreement bars a representation
period provided it is ratified within a
reasonable time.
The IELRB held that to establish a
bar, an agreement must contain
substantial terms and conditions of
employment so as to substantially
stabilize labor relations between the
parties and should chart the course of
the bargaining relationship.  The ALJ
had concluded that the tentative
agreement was incomplete with
respect to retroactivity and health
insurance.  The IELRB ruled that the
evidence demonstrated that retroac-
tivity had always been a Local 362
proposal and was never an issue in
negotiations, thus demonstrating that
the agreement was always considered
retroactive.
The evidence indicated that the
parties had agreed to replace partici-
pation in the Central Laborer’s Health
and Welfare Plan with a private
insurance group that Local 362 would
select, with the district making a fixed
contribution per employee.  Although
the local had yet to select the plan and
details concerning a flexible spending
arrangement and a stipend to be paid
to employees whose premiums were
less than the district’s contribution
were yet to be worked out, the IELRB
11
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Joint Employers
the teacher engaged in union activity
when he filed grievances, and the CBE
was aware of the union activity. The
IELRB found that the union also
provided evidence that CBE  failed to
hire the teacher because of his union
activity. The statement made by the
consultant reflected CBE hostility
toward the grievance arbitration.
Moreover, the CBE’s actions began
when the teacher first sent out
resumes, approximately one month
after the arbitrator’s award. Therefore
the IELRB reversed the Executive
Director’s recommended dismissal of
the complaint.
In AFSCME Council 31 v. ISLRB, 216
Ill. 2d 519 (2005), the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC) was not a
joint employer of a private contractor’s
employees who provided medical care
to DOC inmates. AFSCME, which
represented employees of the contrac-
tor, Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
argued that Wexford and the DOC
were joint employers.  Quoting Orenic
v. ISLRB, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 537 N.E.2d
784 (1989), the court defined joint
employers as “two or more employers
exert significant control over the same
employees – where . . . they share or
codetermine those matters governing
essential terms and conditions of
employment.”  The court held that
control must be actual, rather than
theoretical.
The court observed that Wexford
controlled recruitment and hiring of
its employees.  Although the DOC
conducted background checks on
Wexford employees, it conducted
similar checks on all other persons
with regular access to its prisons, as a
matter of prison security rather than
employment policy.  Similarly, al-
though DOC officials received copies of
employees’ requests for paid-time-off
N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2005),
the Fourth District Appellate Court
reversed the State Panel and held that
parking fees that the University of
Illinois charged university peace
officers were not a mandatory subject
of bargaining.  The court agreed with
the State Panel that the fees were a
condition of employment, but reversed
the Panel’s holding that they did not
involve a matter of inherent manage-
rial authority.  The court found that
the income from parking, the control of
university land, equal treatment of all
employees and staff, and the need to
consider the impact of bargaining with
sixteen other bargaining units were
central to the employer’s management
control.  The court also found that the
parking budget and locations were
intimately tied to the Employer’s plan
for the University.
The court concluded, without
remanding to the ILRB, that the
burdens of bargaining greatly out-
weighed the benefits.  The existence,
location and cost of parking were
aspects of the employer’s daily
business and overall educational
mission.  If the employer were forced
Subjects of Bargaining
and sometimes made recommenda-
tions, their recommendations focused
on prison operational needs and they
lacked authority to approve or deny the
requests.  Although prison wardens
could issue stop orders barring
Wexford employees from their facili-
ties, such orders could apply to other
individuals and were issued for
security and not employee disciplinary
purposes. The ultimate decision
whether to terminate an employee who
was subject to a stop order rested with
Wexford. Accordingly, the court
concluded that DOC was not a joint
employer and that the ISLRB had
properly dismissed a representation
petition and an unfair labor practice
charge filed by AFSCME against DOC.
In University of Illinois v. ILRB, 836
?
Further
References
to bargain over the issue, it would
adversely affect the employer’s master
plan for the university.  The court
issued a similar ruling under the
IELRA in University of Illinois v.
IELRB, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1116, 836
N.E.2d 199 (4th Dist. 2005).
  
(compiled by Yoo-Seong Song, Librar-
ian, Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations Library, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Papke, Leslie E. PENSION PLAN
CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: THE CASE OF MICHI-
GAN STATE EMPLOYEES.
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, vol.
57, no. 2, June 2004. pp.329-339.
The author examines the effect of the
pension reform in Michigan, which
allowed the existing state employees to
switch from the traditional defined
benefit (DB) pension plan to a defined
contribution (DC) plan.  In 1997, the
state of Michigan decided that the
state would no longer offer the DB plan
for new employees, and new state
employees would be enrolled in an
individual DC plan. The existing
employees were allowed to move their
fully vested DB benefits  to a new DC
plan. According to the survey
conducted by the author, only 6
percent of the existing employees
switched to the DC plan, which
implied low demand for individual
plans.  The author also discovered that
the key factor for switching to the
portable DC plan was the ability to
have a lump-sum amount to transfer,
not salary or age.  While this study is
limited to one state  the author believes
that the findings of the survey provide
valuable suggestions for possible
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(Books and articles anotated in
Further References are available on
interlibary loan through ILLINET by
contacting your local public library or
system headquarters.)
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privatization of Social Security.
Mastracci, Sharon H. & Thompson,
James R.  NONSTANDARD
WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR.  RE-
VIEW OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL
ADMINISTRATION, vol. 25, no.
4, December 2005.  pp. 299-324.
The authors discuss a growing trend of
having nonstandard work arrange-
ments (NSWAs) in the private sector
and argue that this trend will soon be
prevalent in the public sector.  The
authors define NSWAs as “those other
than full-time, permanent positions”
such as “seasonal, part-time, and
temporary agency work.” The authors
explain that NSWAs have received
increasing attention mainly from
worker rights and legal communities.
The worker rights community is
concerned that possibly a dual labor
market exists, and the secondary
labor market consists primarily of
minority and women workers.  The
legal community has also paid close
attention to NSWAs because of their
employment rights and employer
responsibilities towards NSWAs. The
authors survey current NSWA activi-
ties in the public sector, and argue
that this new phenomenon will be
accepted widely in the public sector
soon.
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